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core/message_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package core
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestSanitizeAttachmentFileName covers the basename-stripping rules used by
+// SaveFilesToDisk to reject path-traversal in user-supplied filenames.
+func TestSanitizeAttachmentFileName(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		in, want string
+	}{
+		{"image.png", "image.png"},
+		{"subdir/file.txt", "file.txt"},
+		{"../../escape.txt", "escape.txt"},
+		{"/etc/passwd", "passwd"},
+		// Windows-style separators get normalized so Linux strips them too.
+		{`..\..\windows-escape.txt`, "windows-escape.txt"},
+		{`C:\Users\foo\bar.exe`, "bar.exe"},
+		// Anything that would still join to a parent / current directory is
+		// returned as "" so the caller falls back to a generated name.
+		{"..", ""},
+		{".", ""},
+		{"", ""},
+		{"../", ""},
+		{`..\`, ""},
+		{"./../foo", "foo"},
+	}
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.in, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := sanitizeAttachmentFileName(tt.in)
+			if got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("sanitizeAttachmentFileName(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSaveFilesToDisk_RejectsPathTraversal is a regression test for a real
+// path-traversal vulnerability in SaveFilesToDisk: the attachment FileName
+// (which comes from user-controlled IM/HTTP upload metadata) was passed
+// directly to filepath.Join, so an attacker uploading a file named
+// "../../escape.txt" wrote outside the intended attachments directory into
+// the agent's workDir / above. The fix sanitizes FileName to a basename;
+// this test asserts every file lands inside attachDir, with no escapees.
+func TestSaveFilesToDisk_RejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
+	workDir := t.TempDir()
+	attachDir := filepath.Join(workDir, ".cc-connect", "attachments")
+
+	files := []FileAttachment{
+		// The original repro: walks two levels up out of attachments and
+		// out of .cc-connect/, landing directly in workDir.
+		{FileName: "../../escape.txt", Data: []byte("payload")},
+		// Three levels up — would land in workDir's parent without the fix.
+		{FileName: "../../../way-up.txt", Data: []byte("payload")},
+		// Windows-style separators must also be stripped on Linux so a
+		// cross-platform attacker can't bypass the basename guard.
+		{FileName: `..\..\winescape.txt`, Data: []byte("payload")},
+		// Subdirectory in the name — file should land in attachDir, not in
+		// a created subdir, since we strip directory components.
+		{FileName: "subdir/inner.txt", Data: []byte("payload")},
+		// Plain name should still work normally.
+		{FileName: "ok.txt", Data: []byte("payload")},
+		// A name that sanitizes to empty should fall back to a generated
+		// name in attachDir, not crash and not escape.
+		{FileName: "..", Data: []byte("payload")},
+	}
+
+	paths := SaveFilesToDisk(workDir, files)
+
+	// Every returned path must live inside attachDir.
+	for _, p := range paths {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(p, attachDir+string(filepath.Separator)) {
+			t.Errorf("SaveFilesToDisk wrote outside attachments dir: %q (attachDir=%q)", p, attachDir)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Walk the workDir tree and confirm no file landed above attachDir.
+	if err := filepath.Walk(workDir, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
+		if err != nil || info.IsDir() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(path, attachDir+string(filepath.Separator)) {
+			t.Errorf("found stray attachment outside attachments dir: %q", path)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("walk: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Sanity: at minimum the legitimate "ok.txt" must have been written.
+	okPath := filepath.Join(attachDir, "ok.txt")
+	if _, err := os.Stat(okPath); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("legitimate ok.txt not saved: %v", err)
+	}
+}